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abstraCt. The concession pricing is one of the most important issues during the negotia-
tion period of PPP contracts. Pricing should vary in accordance with risks assumed by the 
private sector and embody equitable risk sharing between the government and the private 
sector to lower the minimum feasible concession price and ensure effective risk management. 
In this study, a general concession pricing model is developed through cost-benefit analysis 
from the perspective of the private sector. The model integrates project risk variables, price 
parameters, and other financial elements into a concession pricing formula based on cash 
flow table. Meanwhile, to cope with the occurrence of unforeseeable losses triggered by risk 
factors, such as interest rate fluctuation, inflation, traffic volume change, etc., a price adjust-
ment mechanism is established to adjust the initial price and ensure the project’s financial 
viability. The concession pricing model and adjustment mechanism allow the government and 
the private sector to reach a consensus on the tariff scheme of a PPP project. It is believed 
that the model is beneficial to create a “win-win” situation for both the government and the 
private sector. 
Keywords: Public-private partnership; Concession pricing; Price adjustment; risk factor; 
Highway project
1. introduCtion 
roads play a pivotal role in the econom-
ic development of a nation by increasing its 
productivity and competitiveness (singh and 
Kalidindi, 2006). since 1990, under the guid-
ance of the overall planning for state high-
way trunk line, China’s highway construction 
picked up speed, the mileage of highway built 
each year rose from several dozen thousand 
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meters to above one thousand kilometers as 
shown in figure 1. By the end of 2008, the 
total mileage of China’s highway had reached 
60,300 km, which enabled it to rank second 
place in the world after the United states 
(China Investment Consultant, 2010).
In order to resist the adverse impact of the 
international economic environment and ex-
pand domestic demand, efforts will further be 
made to increase the annual investment scale 
in fixed asset of transport facilities in 2010 to 
reach one trillion rmB (6.8 rmB = 1 UsD) in 
the context of global financial crisis. China’s 
highway construction will once again pick up 
momentum. according to the current construc-
tion plan under way and the near future in-
vestment plan, it is expected that the annual 
newly added mileage of China’s highway will 
be maintained at a level of 6000 km in the 
next four years (China Investment Consult-
ant, 2010). China plans to complete its state 
highway network by 2020. By that time, the 
total mileage of highway open to the pub-
lic will reach 100,000km (China Investment 
Consultant, 2010). However, inadequate gov-
ernment funding may limit the development 
of highways. The average construction cost of 
a highway project is around 4.4 million UsD 
per kilometer in plains and rolling terrains 
and nearly 11.8 million UsD per kilometer in 
mountainous regions. such high construction 
costs may impose budgetary pressure on the 
government (yang, 2007). In order to resolve 
the capital shortage, “Public-private partner-
ship (PPP) financing modalities, with the abil-
ity of providing fund, efficient management, 
and technology have been identified by the 
Chinese government as innovative tools for 
leveraging financial and managerial resources 
to major infrastructure projects” (asian Devel-
opment Bank, 2005). 
owing to the special features of PPP 
projects, such as long operation cycle, high de-
mand for capital, wide range of risk factors, 
and the complexity in the risk sharing struc-
ture, formulating a rational concession price 
based on equitable risk sharing is conducive to 
safeguard the rights and interests of both the 
government and the project company. Howev-
er, early project practices and research stud-
ies indicated that the growth of Chinese PPP 
market has been greatly hindered by a lack of 
market pricing (Chen and messner, 2005). The 
concession price not only determines the value 
assessment at the investment decision-making 
stage, but also can greatly affects the cash flow 
during the project operation period. It is the is-
sue of the highest concern between both the gov-
ernment and the project company. While, the 
existing pricing for products or services of PPP 
project lacks theoretical foundation and scien-
tific pricing rules, which leads the concession 
figure 1. Development history of highway system in China
Kilometers
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price to be fixed either too high or too low (Li, 
2007). This study aims at developing a scien-
tific and rational concession pricing model for 
PPP highway projects. It is expected that the 
proposed pricing model can enable the PPP 
model to better promote highway development. 
This research framework proposed can also be 
used as a reference to study other facilities’ 
pricing problems.
2. literature review 
over the past ten years, a large number 
of PPP highway projects have been procured 
through concession contracts in China. mean-
while, an increasing number of studies on PPP 
projects’ management were conducted covering 
a wide range of topics such as risk manage-
ment, concession pricing, legal issues, govern-
ment supervision, etc. among them, equitable 
risk allocation/sharing and concession pricing 
are two of the top issues of the concern to PPP 
practitioners and are closely related to a PPP 
project’ success (sun, 2006). The essence of 
PPP model is the risk re-allocation between the 
government and the private sector (Ke et al., 
2009). The success of PPP projects is greatly 
depends on the transfer of risks to the parties 
best able to manage them (singh and Kalid-
indi, 2006). an appropriate incentive scheme 
based on risk allocation would instigate con-
cessionaires to improve their performance (ye 
and Tiong, 2003). The concessionaire can also 
enjoy the gain generated from risk manage-
ment through charging the specific risks as-
sumed in the form of risk premium. like any 
other capital investment programs, a PPP 
project is financially viable only if it attains 
a reasonable return rate (ng et al., 2007). 
However, recent project practice reveals that 
a great number of PPP highway projects are 
actually not profitable (Deng, 2007).
Due to a lack of rational market pricing 
and price adjustment mechanism, the cash 
flow estimation of PPP highway projects is 
usually overshadowed by risks and uncertain-
ties such as construction cost overrun, infla-
tion, low traffic volume, and excessive rene-
gotiation. The concession tariff (price) should 
be a variable, which may be increased if the 
specified risk factors are worse than expected 
or lowered if they are better than expected. 
Concession price based on inequitable risk 
sharing may protect the concessionaire from 
commercial risks, but may also discourage ef-
forts in efficiency and cost control (Chen and 
messner, 2005). While, risk allocation is not a 
rigid framework, when risk sharing is applied 
to specific project located in different areas, it 
must be strategically suited for the local social, 
legal, economic, political, technological envi-
ronments and project characters (yang, 2007). 
The more risk the private sector commits to a 
project, the higher concession price the private 
sector is more likely to charge. To calculate an 
appropriate concession price for a given PPP 
highway project, it is essential to understand 
its risk sharing structure.
PPP practitioners are trying to develop a 
better toll/ tariff or concession period model for 
their PPP projects (ng and Xie, 2008; Xu et 
al., 2012). A lot of financial tools such as the 
cost-benefit analysis, net present value (NPV), 
nPV-at-risk have been initiated. li (2007) 
designed a concession pricing model via cost-
benefit analysis based on NPV calculation, and 
was verified by a typical case. Shen and Wu 
(2005) proposed a BoTCcm model with the 
consideration of risk impact for formulating a 
concession period. ye and Tiong (2003) evalu-
ated the mean nPV and nPV-at-risk of differ-
ent concession period structures with monte 
Carlo simulation based on an assumption that 
the variable obeys normal distribution. sun 
(2006) built a pricing model for BoT products 
based on risk allocation and proposed a suit 
of methods to quantify risks. singh and Ka-
lidindi (2006) developed a traffic revenue risk 
management framework for PPP road projects 
through annuity model in India and discussed 
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the qualitative risk allocation, payment mecha-
nism, and concessionaire selection frameworks 
in detail. ng et al. (2007) proposed a simula-
tion model for optimizing the concession period 
of public-private partnerships schemes. Their 
results show that the risks and uncertainties, 
such as a change in inflation rate, traffic flow, 
and operation cost, could highly influence the 
decision on the concession period. 
The basic guideline for determining the 
concession price is that the concession price 
should allow the concessionaire to recoup in-
vestment costs and earn reasonable profits 
within concession period, and make the gov-
ernment to achieve Value for money (Zhang, 
2009). While, a comprehensive literature re-
view reveal that a systemic consideration of 
pricing parameters for concession pricing 
model is still not available. Concession con-
tractual terms are normally grounded on pro 
forma financial statements conducted during 
the feasibility study stage of the PPP high-
way project. Change in any one of the terms 
will likely alter the cash flow and deviate from 
the expected project return (liou and Huang, 
2008). Thus, a price adjustment mechanism in 
the concession contract that allows the conces-
sionaire to adjust the toll/tariff is also indis-
pensable (ng et al., 2007). 
3. researCh methodology
The general framework of this research is 
shown in figure 2. The research methods em-
ployed in this study encompass a comprehen-
sive literature review, a cost-benefit analysis, 
case study and a fuzzy set theory. a total of 
four steps are conducted to establish this con-
cession pricing model and price adjustment 
mechanism for PPP highway projects. 
figure 2. The research flow of concession pricing and adjustment model for PPP highway projects
1 Concession pricing parameters 





Concession pricing and adjustment model
3 Risks influencing concession pricing 2 Initial concession pricing model 
4 Concession price adjustment 
mechanism 
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step 1: The concession pricing parameters 
of PPP highway projects were first compiled 
and discussed based on a comprehensive lit-
erature review. 
step 2: a concession pricing model is then 
developed through a cost-benefit analysis from 
the private sector’s perspective based on the 
cash flow table. However, the concession price 
is determined at the biding stage which is cal-
culated before the actual occurrence of risks. 
There may be a big difference between the 
forecasted cash flow and the actual cost and 
benefit of PPP projects.
step 3: Thus, case studies were adopted to 
explore the critical risk factors influencing the 
concession price determination of PPP high-
way projects and eight critical factors that may 
have a significant impact on cost and benefit of 
PPP highway projects were extracted through 
content analysis.
step 4: finally, a price adjustment mecha-
nism is developed to adjust the initial conces-
sion price based on equitable risk sharing. 
4. ConCession priCing 
parameters
The primary element of price design in a 
PPP project is to determine a reasonable base 
tariff to ensure that the project is financially 
viable (Cheng and Tiong, 2005). net Present 
Value (nPV) employed in the investment deci-
sion-making is applied as one of the most ap-
propriate indicators. The nPV of a PPP high-
way project refers to the sum of the present 
values of a stream of cash flow. If NPV is equal 
to or above 0, the project is acceptable, and 
vice versa. The general equation for the nPV 






























































































































































































where: NCFi = net cash flow relative to point 
in time i; CIi = cash onflow relative to point 
in time i; COi = cash outflow relative to point 
in time i; n = concession period; i = discount 
rate.
In this study, cash flow analysis was adopt-
ed as the basis for concession price determina-
tion. The price determination parameters can 
be classified into two categories (Figure 3). One 
is the cash outflow parameters, which comprise 
total construction investment cost and opera-
tion cost. The other is the cash inflow parame-
ters, which include concession period, expected 
Internal Rate of Return, daily vehicle flow, and 
concession price. The concession price can be 
determined by five other parameters through 
nPV calculation. This forms the basis for the 
development of concession pricing formula. 
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Total construction investment cost. Total 
investment for the construction of highway 
projects consists of building engineering cost, 
purchase cost for equipment, tools and instru-
ments, installation engineering cost, other 
engineering costs, reserve fund (reserve for 
appreciation, basic reserve fund) and inter-
est during construction period. It is the cash 
outflow incurred during the construction pe-
riod, and is one of the key factors affecting the 
pricing of PPP highway projects. The higher 
the total investment is, the larger the project 
cost will be. Thereby, the concession price will 
surely become higher to ensure its minimum 
investment return rate of the concessionaire. 
Operating cost. operating cost refers to cash 
outflow incurred during the operation period of 
the PPP highway projects, which mainly in-
cludes: power fee (road lamp), labor welfare 
fee, daily maintenance fee, management fee, 
taxation fee, etc.
Daily vehicle flow. The volume of traffic 
flow is the primary factor that directly affects 
the project’s financial benefits. If the traffic 
flow fails to reach the expected level or fails 
to reach the expected growth rate, the project 
will not have sufficient cash flow to pay back 
principal and interest to the creditor, pay off 
operation expenses and garner profit. The vol-
ume of traffic flow is affected by a variety of 
factors, which depends on the economic condi-
tion of relevant regions where the highway is 
located, the population of vehicles and users’ 
inclination to pay driving expenses, etc (yang, 
2007). Due to the difficulty to provide long term 
forecast on the social economic development of 
a country or region, there is often a tendency 
to exaggerate traffic flow at the stage of fea-
sibility study of projects (Bain and Plantagie 
2003). many projects are therefore exposed to 
potential risks of relatively large inadequacy 
in traffic flow (Li, 2007). 
Concession Term. as an index of time and 
economics, Concession Term (CT) exerts direct 
impact on the size of the project’s investment 
return. from the perspective of private inves-
tors, CT is the economic cycle of the highway 
project, and they hope CT to be as long as possi-
ble so that their chances to earn profits and the 
amount of profits will be greater. However, the 
local government has opposite idea. They hope 
the CT to be as short as possible so that its con-
trol and ownership of the project can be realized 
sooner. Judging from existing project statistics, 
most PPP projects in countries around the world 
adopt fixed concession term, such as 407 High-
way in Canada, Citong Bridge in China and 
the south-north Highway Project in malaysia 
(yang, 2007), which allow the private sector bid 
the project through concession pricing. 
Expected Internal Rate of Return. Irre is 
one of the key factors in determining the con-
cession price of PPP projects. It is required to 
guarantee that the investors can return the 
bank’s loan and interests, recover capital and 
achieve the rational investment returns. If the 
IRRe is fixed too high, it will surely result in 
the concession term too long or the concession 
price too high, thus harm the interests of both 
the government and the public. In contrast, if 
the concession price is fixed too low, it will be 
unfavorable for attracting private investors. at 
present, the determination of Internal rate of 
return is invariably subject to subjective as-
sumption. according to established practices in 
China, the Internal rate of return for inves-
tors of large infrastructure facility is around 
15% (li, 2007). 
5. ConCession priCing model  
for ppp highway proJeCts 
The principle for pricing of a PPP project 
is to safeguard the interests of the public, 
meanwhile ensuring that the private sector 
has rational profits through appropriate risk 
management. In other words, products or serv-
ices of a public engineering project (social ben-
efits) should be provided at the lowest price 
without damaging the survival ability of the 
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project and be equipped with sufficient incen-
tives to encourage the private sector to provide 
and improve services (Li, 2007). Cost-benefit 
analysis is employed here to analyze cash 
flow, which has been reported by Li (2007). 
However, corrections and revisions are made 
in this study based on li (2007)’s research. 
Cost-benefit analysis compares the cost and 
benefit of the project and ensures the project 
to be economically feasible. a commonly used 
index is BCR (Benefit Cost Ratio), which is 
the ratio between the benefit of net present 
value acquired during operation period of a 
PPP project and the cost of net present val-
ue invested in the construction period. When 
BCR ≥ 1, the benefit of net present value is 
equal to or greater than the cost of present 
value at the expected Internal rate of return, 
the project is economically rational, and vice 
versa (Huang, 2004). In this study, cost-benefit 
analysis takes “table of financial cash flow for 
project capital fund” as the basis. It reflects 
the viewpoint of the investors, adopts capital 
fund as the calculation target, and regards 
loan interest payment and principal payback 
as cash outflow (Huang 2004). The simplified 
table of financial cash flow for project capital 
fund is shown in Table 1, which aims to review 
the profit earning ability of the capital fund 
after deducting the income tax. 
table 1. Simplified cash flow of project capital fund from the perspective of the private sector
Construction period operation period Transfer period 
Cash inflow 0
– sales income (Pt Qt) 
– Other cash inflow (Y1t + y2t)
0
Cash outflow – Project capital fund Ct
– Payback of loan principal Plt
– Payment of loan interest (ltrt)
– operation cost Cot
– Business tax Tat
– sales tax and extra charges TBt
– Income tax TCt
0
Concession price in the tth year Pt, 
Daily average traffic flow in the tth year Qt, 
other operation income in the tth year (i.e. advertisement income etc) y1t, 
Government subsidy in the tth year y2t, 
Project capital fund in the tth year Ct, 
Payment of loan principle in the tth year Plt, 
loan balance in the tth year lt, 
Interest in the tth year rt, 
operation cost in the tth year Cot, 
Total cost in the tth year oCt, 
Business tax and tax rate in the tth year Tat, T1t, 
sales tax extra charges and tax rate in the tth year TBt, T2t, 
Income tax and tax rate in the tth year TCt, T3t, 
TC is the Concession Term, 
T0 is construction period, 
Dt Depreciation fee.
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Based on Table 1, the annual benefit net 
value and capital fund net present value can 
be derived as follow.
1) Annual benefit net value =
Sales income + Other cash inflow – Loan 
principal – loan interest – operation cost – 
Business tax – extra charges of sales tax – 
Income tax =
PtQt + y1t + y2t – Plt – ltrt – Cot – Tat – 
TBt – TCt (1)
2) Capital fund net present value =
 (2)
where: Concession price in the tth year Pt = 
P(1 + Inf)t; P denotes initial price; Inf de-
notes inflation rate.
operation cost Cot = Total cost – Depreciation 
fee – amortization charge – financial fee =
oCt – Dt –0 – ltrt = oCt – oI/TC – ltrt
where: oI denotes total cost; TC denotes con-
cession term.
Provided that it discounts the income and 
expenditure to a reference time point T0. ac-
cording to cost benefit analysis B = C, the BCR 




(P Q + Y + Y Pl L R C TA TB TC )(1+ i)t
t=T +10
t t t t t t t t t t
t























(Y + Y Pl L R C TA TB TC )(1+ i)t
1 1 2 0
0 1
+

































(Y + Y )(1+ i) (Pl L R )(1+ i) ( L
1 1 2+























































(Y + Y )(1+ i) (Pl L R )(1+ i) ( L
1 1 2+








































( ) Q ( )
where: Business tax Tat = (Pt Qt + y1t)T1t; extra charges of sales tax TBt = (PtQt + y1t)T1t.T2t; 
Income tax TCt = {PtQt + y1t + y2t – oCt – (PtQt + y1t) T1t – (PtQt + y1t)T1t.T2t}T3t.
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Based on formula (4), the PPP participants 
only need to input the actual numerical value 
of variables into the formula. Then the initial 
price of a PPP highway project can be calcu-
lated. However, before confirming the calculat-
ed initial price, the affordability of the public 
is another factor deserving consideration (li, 
2007). If the price exceeds the affordability 
of the public, the government or private sec-
tor can further extend the concession period 
through fixing the maximum concession price 
calculated by formula 4. 
6. risK faCtors influenCing 
ConCession priCing 
from formula 4, it can be seen that the 
above initial price is determined at the bid-
ing stage of PPP projects based on the forecast 
of cash flow, which is subjective and is con-
ducted before the project starts (i.e. before the 
actual occurrence of risks). Price adjustment 
is therefore indispensable for coping with the 
risks in the process of project implementation, 
especially some risks beyond the management 
ability of private sector, such as government 
intervention risk, inflation risk, market risk, 
etc. (Tiong et al., 1997; yu, 2006; shen and Wu, 
2005). ng et al. (2007) and Xu et al. (2011) be-
lieved that it is necessary to identify the poten-
tial risk factors that could have serious effects 
on cash flow during the construction and op-
eration period of PPP projects and to examine 
the effects on the cost and benefit. Seven real 
cases were scrutinized to explore the risk fac-
tors influencing price setting of PPP highway 
projects. The general information of the seven 
cases is compiled and shown in Table 2 (for 
more detailed information about these cases, 
please refer to sun, 2006; li, 2007 and yang, 
2007) and eight potential risks that may have 
a strong impact on concession pricing of PPP 
table 2. General information of the eight selected PPP highway projects 
Project name/ 
location








111.8 Km 0.7 biliion UsD Chongqin Tie 
fayu-sui highway 
company limited 




north - south 
highway
900 Km 1.8 billion UsD United engineer 30 1988 open 
to the 
public
















143.205 Km 0.94 billion UsD Chinese railroad 
engineering 
company
















185 Km 0.66 billion UsD Ge Zhou dam 
company





65.3 Km 0.40 billion UsD Cen-Wu highway 
company
29 2003 open 
to the 
public
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highway projects were extracted through con-
tent analysis. It comprises 1) completion risk, 
2) market risk, 3) legislative risk, 4) force ma-
jeure, 5) operation cost risk, 6) inflation risk, 
7) interest rate fluctuation, and 8) government 
subsidy as shown in Table 3. 
The estimated cash outflow (cost) and cash 
inflow (benefit) of PPP highway projects could 
be highly influenced by these factors as dem-
onstrated in figure 4. The corresponding re-
lationship between risk factors and variables 
of concession pricing formula is demonstrated 
in figure 5. It is essential for both the pri-
vate sector and the government to take into 
account the impact of these risks when con-
sidering concession pricing design. although 
only eight critical risks are demonstrated here, 
other critical risks that the project promoter 
encountered may also have a direct impact on 
the pricing formula. shen and Wu (2005) and 
ng et al. (2007) regard that it is reasonable 
and beneficial to incorporate risk variables 
into the concession price determination. 
7. ConCession priCe adJustment 
meChanism
The concession pricing model incorporated 
the risk variables into the pricing formula, 
the price adjustment of a PPP project can be 
conducted directly through adjusting the corre-
sponding variables. Thus, the price adjustment 
issue can be further turned into the process 
of 1) determining the actual change range of 
risk variables and 2) calculating the adjust-
ment value of risk variables (i.e. risk alloca-
tion between the government and the private 
sector).
step 1: determining the actual change 
range of risk variables
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Operation cost overrun 
Legislative change InflationGovernment subsidy 
Force majeure Interest rate fluctuation 
figure 4. The relationship between risk factors and cash flow (adopted from Yang, 2007)
The determination of actual change range of 
risk variables can be classified into two types. 
one is the risk variables, which can be deter-
mined directly according to the actual project 
data (such as: interest rate fluctuation, govern-
ment subsidy, inflation, and traffic volume). 
The other needs to calculate the actual loss ac-
cused by risk events (such as: completion risk, 
force majeure, operation cost overrun, legisla-
tive change). The value of actual loss can be 
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obtained based on the product summation of 
price and quantities of new added resources 
inputted to project including additional added 
work quantities, materials, labor, equipment 
input, and so on. according to new added Bill 
of Quantities, it can be easily calculated.
step 2: calculating the adjustment value of 
risk variables
The private sector can only obtain compen-
sation on the risks that are assumed by the 
government. meanwhile, the government will 
don’t make compensation to the private sector 
for the loss accused by risks assumed by the 
private sector. likewise, for the risks shared by 
both parties, only the part assumed by the gov-
ernment is allowed to be compensated through 
price adjustment or concession period exten-
sion. However, the determination of equitable 
risk (responsibility) sharing, especially quanti-
tative risk allocation, is a difficult process, as 
the concession contract usually lacks explicit 
definition and explanation on it. Quantitative 
risk allocation between the government and 
the private sector is therefore becomes a bar-
rier, which must be tackled before calculating 
concession price adjustment. 
It is well known that concession price based 
on inequitable risk sharing may protect the 
concessionaire from commercial risks, how-
ever, it may also discourage efforts related to 
efficiency and cost control (Chen and Messner, 
2005). The more risk the private sector as-
sumes in a project, the higher concession price 
the private sector aims to obtain. according to 
Ke (2009) and li (2005)’s survey results, out of 
the above eight risk factors, legislative change 
risk and government subsidy risk are prefer-
ably allocated to the government, completion 
risk and operation cost overrun risk are pref-
erably undertaken by the private sector, and 
the other four risks are preferably assumed by 
both parties jointly as shown in Table 4. 
However, their research results are sub-
jective and implicit in actual application. The 
fundamental principle for risk allocation is 
that risks associated with the implementation 
and delivery of services should be allocated 
to the party best able to manage the risk in 
a cost effective manner (loosemore and mc-
Carthy, 2007) under the limit of government 
regulatory and public satisfaction (Deng et al., 
2006). While, different private enterprises or 
local governments have different resources, 
risk management capability, PPP experience 
and risk preference. Thus it is impractical to 
allocate risk by using a rigid risk allocation 
framework, especially for risks assumed by 
both parties jointly. To resolve this problem, 
a quantitative risk allocation model should be 
applied for the adjustment of risk variables. 
Criteria for quantitative risk allocation are 
listed in Table 5. The practitioner can deter-
mine appropriate weightings for risk allocation 
criteria based on their specific project context 
and set (select) membership function for each 
critical allocation criteria by using fuzzy set 
Theory (figure 6 and Table 6). The quantita-
tive calculations of risk allocation between the 
government and the private sector can be de-
rived by evaluating the risk Carrying Capa-
bility Index of each part, and the proportion 
of risk assumed by each part can therefore be 
determined (as shown in Table 5). 
moreover, the automation process of the 
risk allocation model is developed for the con-
venience of end users with the use of Visual 
Basic for application (VBa) as shown in fig-
ure 7. The computerized model can help re-
duce human and mathematical errors as data 
can be directly inputted by project participants 
and data analysis is then performed by the 
computerized procedure instead of the manu-
al calculation. Participants can simply input 
their individual project information and data 
based on their resources and risk management 
capability and the computerized system will 
provide an equitable risk allocation proportion 
between the government and the private sector 
directly. By using this model, the proportion of 
risk loss compensated to the private sector by 
the government can be calculated. 
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table 5. Calculation of risk Carrying Capability Index 
risk Carrying Capability Index of the government or the private sector
risk allocation criteria Weighting (w) membership function of risk 
allocation criteria (r)
membership function 
of risk Carry 
Capability Index (b) 
1. The ability to avoid, minimize, 
monitor, and control the chance of 
risk occurrence











     
bj B∀ ∈
2. The ability to minimize the loss 
if risk occurs
W2 option please refer to 
figure 6
3. The ability to bear the risk at the 
lowest price
W3 option please refer to 
figure 6
4. Be able to get reasonable and 
acceptable premium
W4 option please refer to 
figure 6
5. The ability to sustain the 
consequences of the risk
W5 option please refer to 
figure 6
6. Be able to assume the direct loss W6 option please refer to 
figure 6
7. The ability to foresee the risk W7 option please refer to 
figure 6
8. Be able to enhance risk 
undertaker’s credibility, reputation 
and efficiency in risk management
W8 option please refer to 
figure 6
9. risk attitude W9 option please refer to 
figure 6
table 6. membership function for each criterion 
Criteria Degree of membership normalized membership functions
Very low (Vl) (1.0, 0.5, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0 ) (0.67, 0.33, 0.00, 0.00, 0.00)
low (l) (0.5, 1.0, 0.5, 0.0, 0.0) (0.25, 0.50, 0.25, 0.00, 0.00)
medium (m) (0.0, 0.5, 1.0, 0.5, 0.0) (0.00, 0.25, 0.50, 0.25, 0.00)
High (H) (0.0, 0.0, 0.5, 1.0, 0.5) (0.00, 0.00, 0.25, 0.50, 0.25)
Very High (VH) (0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.5, 1.0) (0.00, 0.00, 0.00, 0.33, 0.67)
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Take “inflation risk” as an example, which 
is usually undertaken by the government and 
the project company jointly. Provided that 
there is an increase of a PPP project’s infla-
tion rate by 10% during the construction peri-
od, namely, the actual change in inflation risk 
variable is 10%. It makes the construction cost 
overrun and thus reduces the expected return 
rate of Investment. In order to keep the proj-
ect financial viable and maintain due incen-
tive on the private sector, part of inflation risk 
loss that is assumed by the government should 
be compensated to the private sector through 
adjusting inflation variable based on formula 
4 and recalculating a new concession price. 
The adjustment value of inflation risk vari-
able can be determined through quantitative 
risk allocation via computerized fuzzy alloca-
tion model as shown in figure 7. (In this case, 
the weightings of risk allocation criteria are 
assumed as 0.15, 0.13, 0.125, 0.11, 0.10, 0.115, 
0.10, 0.09, 0.08 and the fuzzy memberships are 
selected by research team members randomly 
as shown in figure 7). The calculation result 
indicates that about 46.8% inflation risk should 
be undertaken by the government based on 
both parties risk management capability, in-
centive obtained and risk preference, thus the 
adjustment value of inflation risk variable is 
10% × 46.8% = 4.68%. The new inflation value 
can then directly input equation 4 for conces-
sion price adjustment. moreover, it should be 
note that all concession parameters are inter-
related, the calculator needs to reconsider all 
parameters as a whole and recalculate the con-
cession price. Until now, the concession pricing 
and price adjustment of PPP highway projects 
are thoroughly resolved.
figure 7. Interface of a computerized risk allocation model
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8. ConClusions
The principle for pricing of a PPP project 
is to safeguard the interests of the public, 
meanwhile ensuring that the private sector 
can obtain reasonable profits through appro-
priate risk management. In this paper, six pa-
rameters for determining concession pricing 
were identified by cash flow analysis based 
on engineering economics theory. It comprises 
total construction investment cost, operating 
cost, concession period, expected Internal rate 
of Return, daily vehicle flow and concession 
price. a concession pricing model was then de-
veloped through cost-benefit analysis based on 
the capital fund cash flow table from the pri-
vate sector’s perspective. subsequently, eight 
potential risk factors with potentially serious 
effects on the cost and benefits of construction 
and operation of PPP highway projects were 
identified from prior case studies and the re-
lationship between risk factors and price de-
termination variables were demonstrated. fi-
nally, a rational price adjustment mechanism 
is established to adjust the initial concession 
price based on equitable risk sharing. To fa-
cilitate the quantitative determination of risk 
allocation, a computerized fuzzy model with 
Visual Basic for application has been devel-
oped. However, one limitation of this model is 
that the price adjustment mechanism proposed 
needs further verification with real project 
data in subsequent studies. Research findings 
presented in this paper are believed to be ben-
eficial to the development and application of 
PPP at large and enable interested investors 
to better understand the concession pricing of 
PPP projects. 
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